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Abstract
Globalization connects everyone, from the world’s poorest slum dweller to 
the richest billionaire. Globalization and Global Justice starts by giving a new 
argument for the conclusion that coercive international institutions —whose 
subjects who are likely to face sanctions for violation of their rules— must 
ensure that everyone they coerce secures basic necessities like food, water 
and medicines. It then suggests that it is possible for coercive institutions 
to fulfill their obligations by, for instance, providing international aid and 
making free trade fair. This overview sketches the argument in the book’s 
first half, as which is the focus of the papers in the symposium.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Globalization connects everyone, from the world’s poorest slum dweller 
to the richest billionaire. US subsidies for ethanol contributed to a world 
food crisis in 2008 that caused Haiti’s government to fall. The subsequent 
US financial crisis precipitated the European sovereign debt crisis and a 
global recession felt in even the poorest countries. Today, however, anti-
globalization protests pale in comparison to the new protests against 
economic inequality and oppression that gave rise to the Arab Spring. But 
many of the new protests, from the US occupy movement to those in Tahrir 
Square, also focused on what are now —truly global— economic structures’ 
impacts on individuals’ ability to meet their basic needs.
The first half of Globalization and Global Justice (GGJ) gives a new argument 
for the conclusion that coercive international institutions —whose subjects 
who are likely to face sanctions for violation their rules— must ensure that 
everyone they coerce secures basic necessities like food, water, medicine. 
* The author would like to thank particularly Paula Casal, as well as editors, Marcus Arvan, 
Thom Brooks, and Darrel Moellendorf.
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Otherwise, the book suggests, these people will not secure sufficient 
autonomy, which will be defined below to include the basic reasoning and 
planning capacities necessary to consent, or object, to coercion. The book’s 
second half suggests that it is possible for coercive institutions to fulfill their 
obligations by, for instance, providing international aid and making free 
trade fair. It concludes with a new proposal for Fair Trade in pharmaceutical 
and biotechnology to help people secure access to essential medicines. 
Because the papers in this symposium focus on the argument in GGJ’s first 
half, however, this overview will do so as well. This Autonomy Argument 
proceeds, roughly, as follows:
1)  Coercive institutions must be legitimate (i.e. justified in exercising 
coercive force).
2)  For a coercive institution to be legitimate it must ensure that its 
subjects secure sufficient autonomy to autonomously consent to, or 
dissent from, its rules (henceforth sufficient autonomy).
3)  Everyone, to secure this autonomy, must secure some food and 
water, and most require some shelter, education, health care, social 
support, and emotional goods.
4)  There are many coercive international institutions (that may amount 
to a coercive international institutional system).
5)  So, these institutions must ensure that their subjects secure food, 
water, and whatever else they need for sufficient autonomy.
This argument is intended to address liberals deeply concerned about 
individual freedom. GGJ does not provide an account of individual 
responsibility for bringing about the requisite institutional change. Nor does 
it address tradeoffs between fulfilling the condition for legitimacy it defends 
and other things that matter. 1 Nevertheless, the book attempts to provide 
reasons for liberals of all sorts —as long as they are deeply concerned about 
coercion— to accept the Autonomy Argument’s conclusion.
Although there are many other good arguments for aiding the global 
poor, the book attempts to address two kinds of skeptics: Libertarians and 
statists. Libertarians do not think there are any obligations of global justice 
or legitimacy to provide aid. 2 They are, however, deeply concerned about 
coercion and think no one should have to sacrifice their freedom for others. 
GGJ argues that it is precisely because no one should have to sacrifice their 
freedom for others that there are significant obligations to the global poor. 3 It 
suggests that if, as many have argued, libertarians should be actual consent 
theorists, libertarianism entails that people must secure the autonomy they 
need to consent to coercive rule. So, if the Autonomy Argument goes through, 
1. I discuss some such tradeoffs elsewhere (Hassoun 2008) and in this journal.
2. I use the term “libertarian” throughout to refer only to right-libertarians.
3. I discuss elsewhere the relevant sense in which this is true (Hassoun 2014).
 Globalization and Global Justice in Review 155
LEAP 2 (2014)
libertarians should agree that coercive institutions must ensure that their 
subjects secure food, water, and whatever else they need for this autonomy.
Statists often hold that, because states exercise coercion, to be 
legitimate, they must fulfill significant obligations of global legitimacy 
or justice. GGJ argues that many international institutions also exercise 
coercion. So, statists should agree that these institutions also have these 
obligations. What follows recaps the basic line of thought supporting each 
premise of the Autonomy Argument. In particular, this summary focuses 
on a line of argument for the second premise, which is most relevant 
when addressing libertarians. I suspect that this premise is the most 
controversial —and potentially important— aspect of the argument. In 
the book, I distinguish between the defense of the argument by appeal 
to libertarian principles (the topic of Chapter 3) and the more general 
defense (discussed in Chapter 2) by renaming the Autonomy Argument 
the Legitimacy Argument. Here, however, I will not make much of the 
distinction and simply highlight some of the argumentative moves 
intended to address libertarians.
2. THE FIRST PREMISE
GGJ defines institutional legitimacy in this way: A coercive institution is 
legitimate only if it has the right to use coercive force. 4 Legitimacy, then, 
is a “justification” right to rule through force (Landenson 1980). Having a 
justification right is having a moral permission to make coercive rules and 
give coercive commands. Legitimacy, in this sense, must be distinguished 
from justified authority (Christiano 2004). A coercive institution has justified 
authority if and only if it is legitimate and individuals have a moral duty to 
comply with its rules (Buchanan 2004: 237). Some rights may carry with 
them correlative duties (Simmons 1979). GGJ’s argument does not rely on it 
being the case, however, that whenever coercive institutions have a right to 
rule through force, their subjects are obligated to obey their dictates (though 
this may be so).
According to the first premise of the Autonomy Argument, any coercive 
institution must be legitimate. Although this point is relatively uncontroversial, 
here is an argument in its defense that is intended to appeal to liberals 
4. Legitimacy, as the book uses the term, comes in degrees. Some people believe legitimacy 
is an all or none affair. This is not a substantive disagreement. Those who hold a binary theory 
of legitimacy can specify that an institution is legitimate in the binary sense if it surpasses a 
threshold of legitimacy in the degree sense. However, the degree conception allows for different 
thresholds to be specified for different purposes. For the purpose of the Autonomy Argument, 
one need only suppose that imperfectly legitimate institutions must be reformed. I owe thanks 
to Allen Buchanan for discussion on this point.
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deeply concerned about coercion. Following John Locke, one may hold that 
each person has a natural right to freedom and so, rights-respecting people 
cannot be subject to others’ commands without justification (Locke 1690). 
H.L.A. Hart provides one way of defending a natural right to freedom. Hart 
argues that if there are any natural rights, there is a natural right to freedom 
(Hart 1955). Alternately, one might try to ground the concern for freedom in 
a concern for individuals’ interests or autonomy. But, since the Autonomy 
Argument is not intended to address skeptics about the importance of 
freedom, GGJ does not examine the alternatives at great length.
3. THE SECOND PREMISE
According to the second premise of the Autonomy Argument, to be 
legitimate, coercive institutions must ensure subjects secure sufficient 
autonomy. Consider what this means.
First, people are subject to a coercive institution when the rules of the 
institution apply to them and to secure sufficient autonomy, people must 
be able to reason about, make, and carry out some significant plans on the 
basis of their desires, beliefs, values, and goals (henceforth commitments). 
More precisely, people must be able to reason about, make, and carry out 
the plans necessary to consent or object to the coercive institutions to which 
they are subject. To secure sufficient autonomy people need not be perfectly 
autonomous. People need only possess a few conditions for autonomy. The 
book appeals to these conditions for autonomy to secure broad agreement 
on the Autonomy Argument’s second premise. At least it is not plausible 
to reject this premise because the conditions for autonomy it relies upon 
are too demanding. Those who accept fuller (e.g. Kantian) conceptions of 
autonomy might run a similar argument for more significant obligations to 
the global poor.
Second, what is necessary to ensure that people secure sufficient 
autonomy will vary with the case. Coercive institutions must do whatever 
is necessary (and permissible), to ensure that their subjects become and 
remain autonomous until and unless they autonomously relinquish their 
ability to do so. What is necessary depends on how close one is to being 
able to secure such autonomy and what resources one already has. In cold 
climates, for instance, one may need to secure heat. In the tropics, heat is 
usually unnecessary. Some will be able to secure sufficient autonomy as long 
as they are free from interference. Others, however, need assistance to secure 
sufficient autonomy. The coercive institutions to which these people are 
subject may have to provide this assistance. If, for instance, a person is in a 
coma from which she could recover with proper medical care and she is not 
receiving such care from friends, family, or benefactors, then the coercive 
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institutions to which she is subject must provide it. These institutions have a 
responsibility of last resort. An institution does not lose legitimacy if it does 
not help someone secure sufficient autonomy and this person does not have 
the potential to secure such autonomy. When they are very young, children 
are not able to secure any autonomy at all. Most children who receive proper 
care will be able to secure sufficient autonomy as they get older. If no one 
else does so, a legitimate coercive institution must help these children secure 
such autonomy once they are old enough.
It is possible to defend the condition for legitimacy in the Autonomy 
Argument’s second premise in two steps. What follows will argue, first, that 
coercive institutions can only be legitimate if as many of their subjects 
as possible secure sufficient autonomy. Second, it will argue that such 
institutions must do what they can to ensure subjects secure this much 
autonomy. It is possible to defend the first claim by appeal to the nature of 
liberalism (leaving the possibility constraint implicit where its importance 
is minor). The second claim follows from the first and some observations 
about the nature of ensuring and coercive institutions.
3.1. The First Point Necessary for Establishing the Enabling Condition
At the heart of liberalism is the concern for individual freedom. Recently 
liberals have focused primarily on arguing that coercive institutions must 
be decent, if not fully just (Rawls 1993; Pogge 1989). An equally powerful 
strand in liberal thought, however, expresses the idea that the actual 
relationship between the rulers and each ruled person must be voluntary 
in some way.
Liberals deeply concerned about individual freedom disagree about what 
makes the relationship between the rulers and the ruled voluntary. They 
all agree, however, that this relationship can only be voluntary if the ruled 
possess at least some freedom. This freedom is not constituted by the social 
order and it is compatible with significant constraints on social life (Waldron 
1987: 133). The key idea is that subjects must be free to determine their actions 
and shape the nature of their relationship with the coercive institutions to 
which they are subject (Waldron 1987: 132). Although individuals may not 
have a choice of whether or not they are subject to a coercive institution, 
subjects must be able to exercise some control over the way they react to their 
subjection. Subjects should get to decide whether or not to abide by, dissent 
from, or consent to coercive institution for themselves (Waldron 1987: 146). 
Political liberals almost unanimously agree, for instance, that people have a 
right to dissent from the rule of the coercive institutions to which they are 
subject by conscientious objection, non-violent protest, passive resistance, 
and so forth.
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To consent to, or dissent from, coercive institutions in these ways, people 
must be able to reason about, make, and carry out some significant plans in 
light of their beliefs, desires, values, and goals; they must be able to secure 
sufficient autonomy. 5 (Recall that the conditions for sufficient autonomy 
are quite minimal - people secure sufficient autonomy when they secure 
basic reasoning and planning capacities). So liberals implicitly accept the 
first claim embodied in the enabling condition for legitimacy; those living 
under coercive institutions must be able to secure sufficient autonomy 
for the coercive institutions to which they are subject to be legitimate. Will 
Kymlicka puts the point this way: “liberalism is committed to (and perhaps 
even defined by) the view that individuals should have the freedom and 
capacity to question and possibly revise the traditional practices of their 
community, should they come to see them as no longer worthy of their 
allegiance” (Kymlicka 1992). The book explains, at some length, why liberals 
of many persuasions should accept the first part of the second premise of 
the Autonomy Argument; for coercive institutions to be legitimate, their 
subjects must secure sufficient autonomy.
Consider, here, just why libertarians, in particular, should endorse the 
first part of the second premise of the Autonomy Argument. There is a well-
known argument in the literature for the conclusion that libertarians should 
be actual consent theorists. Very roughly, on the relevant version of actual 
consent theory, coercive institutions must, insofar as possible, secure their 
rights-respecting subjects’ consent until, and unless, they give up the right 
to consent. Any agent, or institution, may be justified in coercing those who 
violate others’ rights. To use an example from John Simmons, even “the Third 
Reich was justified in prohibiting rape and punishing rapists” (Simmons 
1999). But coercive institutions usually do more than this. When they create 
norms, rules, and procedures governing the use of force, for instance, they 
prevent people from defending their own rights. This is clearly the case for 
(even libertarian) states, which claim a monopoly on coercive force within 
a territory traditionally defined. Since libertarians hold that everyone has 
a basic right to defend their rights, consent is required for such coercion. 
Assuming this argument goes through, GGJ notes that, in order to actually 
consent, people must be able to do so. This requires at least basic reasoning 
and planning capacities sufficient to autonomously consent (i.e. sufficient 
autonomy).
5. Recall that this just presupposes some minimal conditions for full autonomy —one 
need not have coherently structured values e.g. to have the basic reasoning and planning 
capacities at issue.
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3.2.  The Second Point Necessary for Establishing the Enabling Condition
Why must coercive institutions do what they can to ensure subjects sufficient 
autonomy? The preceding argument entails that when coercive institutions 
subject people who cannot secure sufficient autonomy to coercive rules and 
do not do what they can to ensure subjects secure this autonomy, they are 
illegitimate. This is because coercive institutions are not justified in exercising 
rights-constraining coercive force over rights-respecting people who could, 
but have not, secured sufficient autonomy. Yet coercive institutions exercise 
such force. If coercive institutions continue to exercise coercive force, 
legitimacy requires that they do what they can to ensure subjects secure 
sufficient autonomy. Coercive institutions do continue to exercise this force 
(insofar as they remain coercive institutions). So, they must do what they 
can to ensure subjects secure sufficient autonomy.
There are a few caveats to this conclusion. Others may have primary 
responsibility for enabling those subject to coercive institutions to secure 
sufficient autonomy. Moreover, if people secure this autonomy on their 
own, with the help of friends and/or benefactors, or give up their right to do 
so, the coercive institutions to which they are subject need not do a thing. 
These coercive institutions must generally step into the breach, however, 
if help is required. It is only if they do this that as many of their subjects 
as possible will secure sufficient autonomy. There may also be other 
conditions for institutional legitimacy. Coercive institutions may even 
be justified in doing other things before enabling their subjects to secure 
sufficient autonomy.
4. THE THIRD PREMISE
The third premise of the Autonomy Argument is this: Most people must 
at least be able to secure some minimal amount of food, water, shelter, 
education, health care, social and emotional goods to secure sufficient 
autonomy. Recall that, to secure the sort of autonomy at issue, people must 
at least be able to reason about, make, and carry out some significant plans 
on the basis of their commitments.
Even without explaining this condition for autonomy in any detail, it 
should be clear that those who lack basic food, water, shelter, education 
and health care are likely to suffer from autonomy undermining disabilities. 
Malnutrition inhibits one’s immune system’s ability to fight infection and 
poor nutrition is linked to many non-infectious illnesses. 6 Similarly, if 
6. Scurvy results from a lack of vitamin C, beri-beri from a lack of thiamine, pellagra from 
niacin deficiency, and macrocytic and microcytic anemia from folic acid and iron deficiencies, 
for instance. There is also a lot of evidence that decent nourishment is important for good 
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people lack adequate shelter, they may be exposed to environmental hazards 
including disasters, pollutants,. parasites, and bacteria and acquire diseases, 
like dysentery, tetanus, typhoid, cholera, or heptatitis from flood water or 
unsanitary living conditions (Red Cross 2007). Those without basic health 
care, food or water are at risk of diseases causing disabilities or premature 
death (ibid.) incompatible with securing sufficient autonomy.
Less obviously, those without basic education, emotional and social 
goods may suffer from autonomy undermining disabilities (Woolcock 2001; 
Doyle 2002). Basic education, emotional and social goods are often necessary 
for securing decent living conditions, health care, livelihood opportunities, 
and earning power (Marmot 2004). Those who lack (formal or informal) 
elementary education may not develop, or maintain, the reasoning and 
planning skills they need to secure sufficient autonomy. 7 Those who lack 
basic emotional and social goods, like self-esteem, are at high risk for mental 
and physical illness, suicide, and early death from other causes (Cullen and 
Whiteford 2001; Brock 1999; Hudson 2005; Woolcock 2001). “Fear, insecurity, 
dependency, depression, anxiety, intranquility, shame, hopelessness, 
isolation and powerlessness... such experiential elements of a bad life... [often 
impact] ... agency” (Brock 1999: 195). It is true that some people are able 
to secure sufficient autonomy without being able to obtain even minimal 
education or social or emotional goods. But, this kind of severe deprivation 
will undermine most people’s ability to secure sufficient autonomy.
5. THE FOURTH PREMISE
Before arguing that there are many coercive international institutions, GGJ 
sketches a conception of coercion. It explains that an institution is coercive 
when individuals, or groups, violating its dictates are likely to face sanctions 
for the violation. A sanction is a punishment or penalty. Coercion usually 
creates conditions under which the coerced have no good alternative except 
to do what their coercer wants them to do. This is usually explained by the 
fact that the coerced are threatened by sanctions. Depending on the kind 
and amount of coercion and so forth, coercion may or may not undermine 
autonomy to any significant degree. Usually, it engages the will of the 
cognitive functioning. Children’s mental functioning can even be impaired if their mothers do 
not receive proper nourishment during pregnancy. Keratomalacia which results from vitamin 
A deficiency, kwashiorkor which results from protein deficiency, and iodine deficiencies can all 
lead to severe disabilities and death. See Leathers and Foster 2004.
7. Stress may contribute to a host of autonomy-undermining mental disorders. Stress can, 
for instance, cause panic attacks and depression. Psychological disorders can reduce the ability 
of one’s immune system to fight infection. See Beaton 2003. The causal evidence suggests that 
perception of low social standing may increase stress which reduces immune functioning and 
can harm health in other ways as well.
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coerced. Still, people can be coerced into doing what they would otherwise 
do freely. Furthermore, institutions can be coercive even if they do not 
coerce anyone into doing anything. If, for instance, a state only creates 
just laws and everyone willingly obeys, it may still be coercive. The state is 
subjecting people to coercive laws, though it never has to sanction anyone 
for disobedience.
GGJ notes that the preceding analysis leaves a lot open. Much hangs on 
what counts as a violation, a punishment or penalty, and a good alternative 
(Anderson 2006). Some hold that only threats can be coercive while others 
say sanctions can include withholding an offered good. There is also 
disagreement about the appropriate baseline relative to which something 
counts as a sanction. It is not clear, for instance, whether one can be 
sanctioned in ways that do not violate rights.
The book allows that some international institutions are not coercive. 
Non-binding treaties like the Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons 
are not coercive. Nor are non-governmental organizations that offer only 
voluntary programs, normally, coercive.
GGJ argues, however, that there are many coercive international 
institutions. It does so by providing examples that should appeal to those 
with widely divergent accounts of coercion. Many international institutions’ 
dictates are binding and non-voluntary.
(Since libertarians tend to think there is a lot of coercion in international 
affairs, what follows will not focus on addressing libertarians, in particular, 
though the book provides additional examples that are intended primarily 
to address libertarians.)
There are many ways the international institutions governing trade 
exercise indirect coercion. Institutions like the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) impose 
sanctions on countries that violate property rights or the rules of the 
market. States enforce these sanctions. The NAFTA sanctioned Mexico for 
prohibiting Metalclad from operating a toxic waste dump in San Luis Potosi, 
for instance. Mexico had to pay Metalclad 16 million US dollars in damages 
(Wallach 2005). The WTO found the US guilty of violating its rules with the 
Byrd amendment. It allowed prosecuting countries to impose import duties 
on the US until the US repealed the act (European Union, 2005). Recently, 
the WTO sanctioned the European Union (EU) by allowing the US to impose 
tariffs on EU goods because the EU had used import licensing requirements 
to support Caribbean banana producers (British Broadcasting Company 
1999). In many cases, laws passed by states as a result of WTO rulings 
eventually coerce businesses and individuals into abiding by the rulings.
The United Nations (UN) also exercises indirect coercion. The UN 
Security Council imposes economic sanctions, air traffic controls, and 
arms embargos on countries, and groups within countries, that threaten 
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international security. The UN has, for instance, sanctioned Rhodesia, Iraq, 
South Africa, Serbia, Montenegro, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Libya, Haiti, Sudan, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leon, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and groups within Cambodia, Angola, 
and Afghanistan (Roberts 2001). The UN Security Council also authorizes 
the use of force against countries threatening international peace. When 
Iraq invaded Kuwait the UN authorized the use of force to stop the invasion. 
The UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force of about 30,000 
troops was involved in military action in Afghanistan from 2001 until 
2014 (United Nations 2003).
Moreover, many countries’ participation in international institutions is 
not voluntary. Countries often pay significant penalties if they do not abide by 
WTO, UN, World Bank or International Monetary Fund (IMF) rules. Sometimes 
countries do not have other good options and so are not free to resist these 
organization’s conditions. Highly indebted poor countries facing default, for 
instance, may have to abide by IMF conditionality. Furthermore, some argue 
that international institutions bear responsibility for poor countries’ having 
no reasonable option but to abide by their rules by having contributed to 
their impoverishment. 8 At least in such cases, international institutions are 
indirectly coercing individuals in the way that a man with a gun indirectly 
coerces someone if he forces another person to threaten the first. 9
Many international institutions also exercise direct coercion. UN 
peacekeeping forces exercise direct coercion by, for instance, taking over 
territory, patrolling borders, and creating safe havens for refugees. Those 
who attempt to wrest control from the UN, or enter its protectorates or safe 
zones without permission, face sanctions for the violation. Peacekeeping 
forces have been deployed in places as diverse as Congo, Iran, Lebanon, 
Sinai, Yemen, the Golan Heights and Cyprus. Between 1988 and 1999 alone, 
the UN initiated forty peacekeeping missions (Roberts 2001).
Other international institutions also coerce individuals directly, 
sometimes in ways that violate rights. Consider, for instance, what happened 
as the humanitarian crisis in the Balkans developed. The UN imposed an 
arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia, a flight ban over Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and economic sanctions against Montenegro and Serbia. 
NATO enforced these measures. In 1999, when the UN peacekeeping force 
failed to prevent the Srebrenica massacre, NATO bombed Bosnia. NATO 
then enforced the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace agreement under the auspices 
8. This condition may not be necessary for coercion. For discussion see Nozick 1969; 
Zimmerman 1981; Gorr 1986; McGregor 1998/89; Held 1972; Van De Veer 1979.
9. Even if individuals’ states have other options and are thus partly responsible for 
coercing their people, international institutions may still be acting wrongly. Knowing how states 
are likely to act, it may not be acceptable for these institutions to act in the ways that they do. 
But this paper sets this point aside.
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of a UN protectorate and brought individuals accused of war crimes to 
The Hague. It thereby directly coerced, and enabled the court to coerce, 
individuals. Eventually, NATO ceded command in Bosnia to the EU, which 
deployed its own troops (NATO 2007).
6. CONCLUSION
Many people resist the idea that there are any obligations of justice to the 
global poor. If the Autonomy Argument goes through, these people are 
mistaken. Legitimacy requires that coercive institutions do what they can 
to ensure that all of their subjects with the potential to secure sufficient 
autonomy secure adequate food, water, shelter, education, health care, 
social and emotional goods. The second half of GGJ argues that there are 
many things we can do to help people secure what they need for sufficient 
autonomy. So, the book concludes, in a world where 18 million people die 
annually of easily preventable poverty-related causes, there are many things 
we can and must do to ensure that everyone secures what they need. 10
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